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INTRODUCTION
Historically, disability has been seen as an essentially medical phenomenon.
In particular, an individual's disability has typically been viewed as a personal,
medical problem that requires an individualized, medical solution. This view-
point has been described as the medical model of disability ("medical model"),
and it has long been the dominant paradigm for understanding disability in
Western culture.
To challenge the idea that disability is essentially medical and to emphasize
its social construction, disability scholars coined and advanced the disable-
ment/impairment binary ("disability binary"). 3 Within this binary, disablement
is said to represent the socially constructed features of disability, while impair-
ment denotes a disabled physiology.4 Yet, by relying on a dichotomy between
social disablement and physiological impairment, the disability binary unders-
cores the notion that disability has a natural, biological essence. Such a notion
may stymie disability rights by reinforcing older, biologically determinist ways
of thinking about disability.
Given that the disability binary now commands considerable theoretical
attention in scholarly discussions of disability, it is appropriate and timely to
critically reassess the disability binary's merits.' The disability binary has re-
ceived sparse critical attention, and no legal scholars have provided a systematic
1. MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM Go AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE
AND THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 27 (2003).
2. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just Right": The Entrenchment of the
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 185-87
(2008).
3. See MICHAEL OLIVER, POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 11
(1990) [hereinafter OLIVER, POLITICS] (distinguishing between impairment and
disability) ("What is at stake here is the issue of causation, and whereas previous
definitions were ultimately reducible to the individual and attributable to biologi-
cal pathology, the [binary framework] locates the causes of disability squarely
within society and social organization."); MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING
DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 5, 28, 33, 35 (1996) [hereinafter OLIVER,
UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY] (affirming the distinction between impairment and
disability); see also Tom SHAKESPEARE, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND WRONGS 13
(2006) ("When the sociologist Michael Oliver became involved with social model
theory in the early 198os, the impairment/disability distinction was further rein-
forced at the core of the disability rights ideology.").
4. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 35.
5. Moira Gatens made a similar introductory observation about the gender/sex
binary before proceeding to examine that binary's merits. MOIRA GATENS,




critique or examined the legal implications attendant to such a critique.' The
disability binary is thus ripe for more incisive examination.
While many legal articles have been focused on suggesting doctrinal
changes to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), this Article takes a step
back to rethink the very meaning of disability. My thesis is that the "biological"
impairment prong of the disability binary is itself socially constructed, and thus
disability is more constructed than acknowledged to date. Accordingly, I make
"disability trouble"-an allusion to Judith Butler's Gender Trouble,7 which
challenged the gender/sex binary of feminist scholarship-by questioning
whether the disability binary is an accurate framework for understanding the
meaning of disability. My argument proceeds as follows.
In Part I, I situate the disability binary within its scholarly context and
identify the lack of legal scholarship that is critical of the social model of disabil-
ity. I also explain why I have coined the term "disability trouble" to represent
the result of my argument that impairment is socially constructed, and I clarify
my use of certain disability terminology.
Part II offers a case for rethinking disability by paying particular attention
to feminist work on the gender/sex binary. I first introduce the gender/sex
binary and the feminist scholarship that emerged in its wake. I then explore the
disability binary as an analogue to the gender/sex binary. To the extent that the
two binaries are similar, feminist work on the gender/sex binary may be
instructive and provide a roadmap for disability scholars attempting to rethink
the disability binary.
In Part III, I argue that impairment, though theorized as biologically
asocial, is indeed a social concept. I first explain why impairment is best unders-
tood as diagnosis. I then focus on two aspects of diagnosis-the creation of
diagnoses and the acts of diagnosis-to show that specific impairments (rang-
ing from sensory impairments to intellectual impairments to mental illnesses)
have been, and continue to be, socially constructed in significant ways. In
particular, I show how the very creation of diagnoses is often spurred along by
political, social, and financial incentives. I also illustrate how the process of
assigning a particular diagnosis to a particular individual is inseparable from
6. For critiques of the disability binary outside of the law literature, see generally
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3 (critiquing the social model); Shelley Tremain, On the
Government of Disability: Foucault, Power, and the Subject of Impairment, in THE
DISABILITY STUDIES READER 185 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2006) (providing a
Foucauldian critique of the term "impairment"); and the essays in DISABILI-
TY/POSTMODERNITY (Mairian Corker & Tom Shakespeare eds., 2002).
7. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
(20o6) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE]. Gender Trouble was originally
published in 1990, JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUB-
VERSION OF IDENTITY (1990), and was republished as a Routledge classic in 20o6.
See also JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 42-43 (2004) [hereinafter BUTLER,
UNDOING GENDER] ("[When] one refers to 'gender trouble' . .. one is ... suggest-
ing that gender has a way of moving beyond that naturalized binary.").
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certain social and interactional phenomena, meaning that end diagnoses are
also socially constructed. Here, I contend that any allegedly biological root of
impairment is contested and refracted by social interests.
Finally, in Part IV, I examine the various implications of making disability
trouble. Understanding disability as having a substantially social origin leads
naturally to the conclusion that society ought to take greater responsibility in
combating disability discrimination. Such an understanding also has implica-
tions for health law policy and the recently amended ADA: A broad, shifting,
and more constructed sense of disability invites certain normative outcomes,
which might warrant law reform, stasis, or some combination of the two.
I. THE DISABILITY BINARY AND TERMINOLOGY
Disability has long been understood as a simple consequence of biology.
Because this perspective encourages "biological determinism"' and ignores the
role of culture in disabling people, disability advocates developed the social
model of disability ("social model") as a response. The social model has been
called the "the big idea" of the disability movement.9 It reframed disability as
being in part a social construct by distinguishing social disablement from phy-
siological impairment.0 Disablement-in contrast to impairment-was "all the
things that impose restrictions on disabled people; ranging from individual
prejudice to institutional discrimination, from inaccessible public buildings to
8. My use of the term "biological determinism" is intended to denote the idea that
our genetic makeup determines and makes inevitable our development as people
with certain traits and opportunities.
9. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 29.
10. A key moment in the social model's intellectual and political history occurred in
1976, when the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS)
published its Fundamental Principles of Disability. UPIAS's differentiation between
impairment and disability would later form the basis of what Michael Oliver
coined "the social model of disability." UNION OF THE PHYSICALLY IMPAIRED
AGAINST SEGREGATION (UPIAS), FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF DISABILITY
(1976); see OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 1-2 ("1 should
say at this point that the original simple idea underpinning my work was not my
original idea but was an idea that I came across in encountering Fundamental
Principles of Disability for the first time." (citation omitted)); id. at 28 (affirming
the impairment/disability distinction in Fundamental Principles of Disability as
being "valid to this day"); see also Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disabili-
ty, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 6, at 197, 197 ("While the
problems of disabled people have been explained historically in terms of divine
punishment, karma or moral failing, and post-Enlightenment in terms of biologi-
cal deficit, the disability movement has focused attention onto social oppression,
cultural discourse, and environmental barriers."); id. at 198-99 (explaining that
the "redefinition of disability itself' is what sets the social model apart from other




unusable transport systems, from segregated education to excluding work ar-
rangements, and so on.""
Separating disability into its biological and social components has thus
been the linchpin for a social model of disability." Indeed, Michael Oliver, who
is widely credited with formalizing and establishing the social model in Western
academia, 3 emphasized disability's social nature precisely by distinguishing
disablement from impairment.14 He explained that disablement has "nothing to
do with the body."" Impairment, however, is "nothing less than a description of
the physical body." 6 Oliver thus used the disability binary to emphasize the
11. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 33. One of the most
common illustrations for understanding disability as a social construct are the
architectural barriers faced by wheelchair users. Adam Samaha has stated: "It is
one thing to be unable to walk. It is quite another matter to be unable to enter a
building unassisted because the architect preferred stairs to ramps." Adam Sama-
ha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1258-59
(2007). In such a situation, a person is disabled-or made to feel disabled-at
least in part by factors outside of the person's own body. Such factors may, under
the social model, include physical, institutional, and attitudinal barriers. Areheart,
supra note 2, at 188.
Tom Shakespeare has explained that one key to understanding the social
model is viewing it as a series of dichotomies: impairment is distinguished from
disability (or what I call "disablement," see infra note 41), thereby creating the dis-
ability binary; the social model is distinguished from the medical model of disabil-
ity; and disabled people are distinguished from non-disabled people. Shakespeare,
supra note lo, at 198-99. Furthermore, under the disability binary, impairment is
individual and private, while disablement is structural and public. Id. at 198. In
this way, impairment might be seen as a remnant of the medical model of disabili-
ty, a paradigm that historically has focused on the impact of an individual's own
physical or mental impairments rather than on factors that reside outside of the
person's body.
12. COLIN BARNES & GEOF MERCER, DISABILITY 65 (2003); MARK RAPLEY, THE So-
CIAL CONSTRUCTION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 62 (2004) (noting that the
"fractioning of a monolithic 'disability' into notions of a (physical or mental)
impairment, with concomitant disability caused by social barriers" is "central" to
the social model).
13. Samaha, supra note ii, at 1251-52 (noting that although the social model's causa-
tion story has been around since the 1970s, it was Michael Oliver who launched
the social model in Western academia in 1990); see also RAPLEY, supra note 12, at
62 ("[T]he social model as a formal statement of social scientific theory is usually
held to originate in the work of Mike Oliver. . . .
14. See supra note 3.
15. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 35.
16. Id.
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constructed nature of disability. The disability binary has since been considered
key to the social model.'
The social model's constructionist account offers several benefits for disa-
bility advocates: (i) It dispels uncritical assumptions that a disadvantage result-
ing from disability is natural or necessary;" (2) it explains how social conditions
contribute to disability disadvantage (which implies that such disadvantage can
be changed through political struggle);19 and (3) it liberates disabled persons by
shifting the attention from an individual's physical or mental deficits to the
ways in which society includes or excludes them. 20 The social model has been
discussed widely both as it pertains to the meaning of disability and as a justifi-
cation for certain policy and legal prescriptions, and it has become a fixture in
legal disability scholarship.
One major drawback of the social model is that it has not been substantially
developed, revised, or rethought since the 1970s." Other social movement
ideologies such as feminism have developed and transformed substantially over
17. Id. at 28 (noting that the disability binary "remains valid to this day"); RAPLEY,
supra note 12, at 62; Samaha, supra note 11, at 1257 ("Key to the social model is a
distinction between personal impairments and disability.").
18. Samaha, supra note 11, at 1253.
19. Id. at 1255; see also SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 30.
20. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 29-30.
21. Samaha, supra note 11, at 1268 (noting that Mary Crossley "helped import the
social model into legal scholarship"); see Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidos-
cope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 653-59 (1999) [hereinafter Crossley, Disability
Kaleidoscope]; see also Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory in All the Rights Places:
Feminist and Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO
ST. L.J. 105, 130-31 (2005) (noting that the social model defines disability as a social
construct and that this viewpoint has become "quite pervasive in the legal aca-
demic literature"); Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel
of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 875-77 (2004) [hereinafter
Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation] (noting that work on the social model "has
gained the attention of the legal academy").
22. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 33-34; see also Mairian Corker & Tom Shakespeare,
Mapping the Terrain, in DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY, supra note 6, at i (noting
that disability studies have "suffered from a theoretical deficit"); Shakespeare,
supra note io, at 199 ("Many leading advocates of the social model approach
maintain that the essential insights developed by UPIAS in the 1970s still remain
accurate and valid three decades later."); id. at 202 ("While acknowledging the
benefits of the social model in launching the disability movement, promoting a
positive disability identity, and mandating civil rights legislation and barrier





time-responding to criticism and changing circumstances.2 3 But social disabil-
ity theory has clung to a strict reading of its founding assumptions.2 4
One possible explanation for this lack of criticality is that disability has been
theorized largely by advocates. 5 The social model, for example, was forged by
disability rights advocates with policy preferences already in mind.' It provided
intellectual justification for the predetermined goals of the disability rights
movement. 7 Later, as leaders of the disability rights movement became
academics, "the social model became an intellectual export. It moved from
interest group device to scholar's tool."" Adam Samaha similarly shows that the
terms of the social model have found their way into legal scholarship, often
accompanied by the uncritical and misguided assumption that the social model
necessarily has normative consequences.' 9 Indeed, most legal scholars have not
been critical of the social science literature on disability, simply citing the social
model as implicit support for policy and legal positions.30 Legal scholars have
23. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 33-34.
24. Id. at 34.
25. See infra notes 26-28.
26. Samaha, supra note ii, at 1254 (noting that disability rights advocates forged the
social model "alongside a political platform"); id. at 1255 ("[T]he social model was
generated within a disability rights movement with policy objectives."); id. at
1280-82 ("Similar notions were percolating elsewhere, but a social model of disa-
bility was driven to the forefront by a movement of disabled people dissatisfied
with existing institutions and policies. Participants sought to define disability, and
thus the movement, in accord with their experience and objectives. . . . Given this
history, it is not surprising that original proponents of the social model supported
social reconstruction to ameliorate disadvantage. This goal was the inspiration for
the model in the first place." (footnote omitted)).
27. Id. at 1282 (noting that the social model was "an accoutrement" to the disability
rights movement); id. at 1269 (noting that the regular connection between the
social model and policy "might follow from affiliation with the disability rights
movement").
28. Id. at 1283 (footnote omitted).
29. See id. at 1267-69 (noting that legal scholars have regularly and mistakenly claimed
that the social model provides a normative basis for making disability policy).
30. See id. at 1267 (noting that in the law literature, "prescriptions for environmental
restructuring regularly follow discussions of the social model"); id. at 1278
(arguing that, in spite of such literature, the social model provides no normative
basis for judgment and policymaking); see also Michael Ashley Stein, Disability
Human Rights, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 91-93 (2007) (noting several limitations of the
social model).
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certainly written about the social model, and have taken account of its centrality
to disability scholarship,3' but few have been critical of the social model.
While the social model has provided a useful vocabulary for theorizing
disability, its terms merit greater scrutiny. The social model-by relying on a
binary division between social disablement and physiological impairment-
unwittingly underscores the notion that disability has a biological essence. In
other words, although the social model was formulated to indicate disability's
constructed nature, it inadvertently reifies the idea that disability is built in part
upon non-social, biological, and essential facts.3 3 Part III will examine whether
disability is rightly seen (through the lens of the disability binary) as being pre-
dicated upon an essentially biological foundation.
In this Article, I argue that impairment is actually substantially socially
constructed and thereby make "disability trouble." I have coined this phrase as
an allusion to Judith Butler's Gender Trouble,3 4 a seminal contribution to femin-
ist scholarship that challenged the gender/sex binary. The gender/sex binary
31. See supra note 21. Even where U.S. scholars have not expressly adopted the social
model, "the overarching orientation" of U.S. disability scholars is "social and
cultural, not medical or individualist." SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 25.
32. See Samaha, supra note 11, at 1253 (arguing that legal scholars have failed to ques-
tion the social model). Adam Samaha's article on the social model suggests that
one explanation for the lack of critical work on the social model by legal scholars:
their apparent belief that the model necessarily entails a normative orientation. Id.
at 1267-68. The social model may thus have a "herding" effect on scholars analyz-
ing disability. Id. at 1269.
To be fair, at least some critical scholarship on disability has recently come
from within the legal academy, with legal scholars questioning the normative
meaning of disability and analyzing models of disability previously resident within
the humanities. See Areheart, supra note 2 (writing on the entrenchment of the
medical model of disability in the media and federal court jurisprudence); Sama-
ha, supra note 11 (arguing that the social model of disability is, properly unders-
tood, addressed toward causation and has no necessary normative implications);
Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (2006) (arguing for a disability human rights paradigm). Still,
this work is young and far from developed. RAPLEY, supra note 12, at 66 (noting
the limits of early "second wave" approaches).
33. RAPLEY, supra note 12, at 66 (noting that impairment and disablement, under the
social model, are paradoxically "reified as structurally given things"). In this way,
impairment might be seen as a remnant of the medical model of disability, which
posits biology as an essential characteristic of the disabled individual. Id.
34. See supra note 7.
35. Toril Moi notes that Butler's scholarship, including Gender Trouble, was "by far
the most important work on sex and gender in the 1990s." TORIL MOI, What is a
Woman?, in WHAT Is A WOMAN? AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 45 (2001); see also ALISON
STONE, AN INTRODUCTION To FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 61 (2007) ("[Butler's] Gend-





states that sex is physiological, while gender is socially constructed. 6 One of
Butler's concerns was that the gender/sex binary, by effectively designating sex
as non-social, left room for biological determinism.37 I am similarly concerned
that the disability binary, by designating impairment as non-social, has left
room for biological essentialism. Accordingly, I seek to make disability trouble
by suggesting that (i) the meaning of disability is not fixed and has a way of
transcending the disablement/impairment binary; and (2) disability is more so-
cial and less biologically laden than previously theorized."8
I am not invoking Butler's popular theory that gender is performative by,
for example, building a case that disablement is merely a stylized repetition of
acts that, over time, produce the appearance of substance.3 9 My argument
instead focuses on appropriating Butler's claim that biological sex is just as
culturally constructed as social gender, and applying it to the disability
context. 40 Just as gender trouble became a rallying cry for scholars seeking to
rethink sex and gender, it is my hope that disability trouble evokes and invites
new ideas about the meaning of disability.
Before proceeding, it bears noting that while many social model theorists
use the term "disability" instead of "disablement" to refer to disability that is
socially constructed, I have used "disablement" for two reasons. First, this is the
term used most often by Michael Oliver, who formalized and popularized the
disability binary within disability studies. Second, there is an analytic benefit to
using "disablement" to denote disability that is constructed socially: Doing so
preserves "disability" as a holistic term that encompasses both impairment and
disablement. In other words, using "disablement" to refer to the socially
constructed component of the disability binary avoids confusion over whether
"disability" is being discussed generally or as part of a dichotomy. Here, I have
endeavored to use "disability" exclusively as a non-dichotomous, holistic term.
However, it is important to note that many of my sources equivocally use
"disability" as both a holistic term and as the dichotomous counterpart to
"impairment" within the disability binary.41
36. STONE, supra note 35, at 30-34.
37. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 7, at 9 ("The presumption of a binary
gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex
whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it.").
38. This use of "disability trouble" parallels Judith Butler's use of the phrase "gender
trouble." BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER, supra note 7, at 42-43 ("[When] one refers
to 'gender trouble' . . . one is ... suggesting that gender has a way of moving
beyond [the] naturalized [gender/sex] binary.").
39. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 7, at 45.
40. Id. at 9-10.
41. It is thus imperative to discern how such scholars are using the term "disability"
in order to avoid confusion.
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II. THE GENDER/SEx BINARY AS ANALOGUE
The disability and gender/sex binaries have intuitive similarities, and to the
extent that the binaries are analogous to each other, feminist work on the gend-
er/sex binary may be instructive for disability scholars attempting to rethink the
disability binary.4' Before evaluating the strength of the analogy, however, it
may be useful to first examine feminist scholarship on the gender/sex binary.43
In particular, recalling the gender/sex binary's trajectory over the last forty years
may help chart a path for future disability scholarship.44
Though many people use "sex" and "gender" interchangeably, feminists
have distinguished between the terms since the late 1960s,45 when they appro-
priated the term "gender" to emphasize the socially constructed nature of sex
and counter the viewpoint that biology is destiny.46 This distinction made theo-
retical sense for psychologists attempting to explain transsexuality.47 Feminists
also found the distinction useful since it allowed them to argue that perceptions
42. A few disability scholars have previously noted the connection between the
gender/sex and disability binaries, but without much examination. See Samaha,
supra note ii, at 1257 (noting this connection in passing); Shelley Tremain, On the
Subject of Impairment, in DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY, supra note 6, at 32, 41
(same).
43. For scholarly exposition on the gender/sex binary within the law literature, see,
for example, Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE
L.J. 1 (1995); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995).
44. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson has lamented that many disability scholars are un-
versed in the related critical enterprises that have come before. Rosemarie
Garland-Thomson, Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory, in THE
DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 6, at 257, 257. She notes that women's
studies and race studies established a model in the academy for identity-based
scholarship. Id. She observes, however, that disability scholars' general lack of
knowledge of related disciplines has led to "a great deal of wheel reinventing." Id.
This work picks up on that critical observation. In particular, advances in
feminist thought may well offer insights for disability given the intuitive similari-
ties between certain aspects of feminist and disability scholarship.
45. Mol, supra note 35, at 3; STONE, supra note 35, at 31; Case, supra note 43, at 2 (not-
ing that "the two terms have long had distinct meanings, with gender being to sex
what masculine and feminine are to male and female").
46. Mol, supra note 35, at 5; Mari Mikkola, Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall20o8/entries/feminism- gender/.
47. Mikkola, supra note 46. The gender/sex distinction achieved traction with the
publication of Robert J. Stoller's book, Sex and Gender, in 1968. GATENS, supra
note 5, at 5. Stoller's work instantly medicalized sex and situated gender as a pure-




and expectations of women are socially produced and thus subject to change.48
The resulting insight was that one's biological sex does not determine one's
social gender.49
In 1990, however, Judith Butler made "gender trouble" by leading a chorus
of feminist scholars who questioned and criticized the gender/sex binary.0
Many questioned whether sex and gender were distinct in the first place, with
some focusing on whether sex classification was solely a question of biology,
and others focusing on whether gender was only social." In the wake of these
deconstructive efforts, some feminists attempted to reconstruct what it meant
to be a woman.53 Such critiques not only enriched feminist thought on human
48. STONE, supra note 35, at 56; Mikkola, supra note 46. Feminists quickly seized upon
Robert Stoller's work since it seemed to offer a "theoretical justification for the
right to equality for all independently of sex." GATENS, supra note 5, at 6-7; see
Mol, supra note 35, at 22-23 (noting that Stoller's ideas in Sex and Gender "were
quickly appropriated by feminists").
49. STONE, supra note 35, at 31 ("[Feminists] valued the [sex/gender] distinction
because it implied that gender expectations and ideas are products of culture and
society, and so can be changed. This challenged the view, widely held at that time,
that women's and men's biology causes them to have the social positions and sta-
tuses that they do."). Stone explains,
We can now be more precise about what it means to say that sex does not
determine gender. Namely, when people form particular ideas about
gender, or behave in typically masculine or feminine ways, or understand
themselves as masculine or feminine, none of these activities is caused by
features of those individuals' biology such as their hormone levels.
Id. at 34.
50. See Mol, supra note 35, at 3 (noting that from the late 198os to the late 1990s, the
gender/sex binary was subjected to "merciless critique" by Butler, Donna Hara-
way, and other poststructuralist theorists of sex and gender).
51. See infra Part III (canvassing feminists' resistance to the claim that sex is solely
biological); see also ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL
THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN (1985) (analyzing scientific claims about
women and men); GATENS, supra note 5, at 3-17 (questioning whether sex may be
understood without reference to "imaginary bodies," meaning socially con-
structed notions of the body).
52. See, e.g., GATENS, supra note 5, at 13-14 (arguing that gender has an "intimate
relation to biology- as -lived in a social and historical context"); Mol, supra note 35,
at 29 ("To deny that biology grounds social norms is to deny that our sexed bodies
produce any gender norms in whatever context."); RAIA PROKHOVNIK, RATIONAL
WOMAN: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF DICHOTOMY 138-41 (Manchester University
Press 2002) (1999) (arguing that gender roles issue directly from biologically sexed
bodies).
53. See, e.g., LINDA MARTIN ALCOFF, VISIBLE IDENTITIES: RACE, GENDER, AND THE
SELF 148 (2006) (arguing that gender is "a position one occupies and from which
one can act politically"); Sally Haslanger, Future Genders? Future Races?, 34 ANN.
PROC. CENTER FOR PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 4, 6-7 (2004) (arguing that gender is
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sexuality, but also catalyzed civil rights through a resulting expansion of legal
protections. One legal innovation to poststructural work on the gender/sex
binary was four generations of sex stereotyping jurisprudence,5 4 each of which
was, as explained by Mary Anne Case, effectuated by a gradual expansion of
Title VII to protect various permutations of gender and sex." Work on the
gender/sex binary has been "fundamental to the development of feminist
thought."56
With this abbreviated history as a preface, it is now appropriate to consider
whether the disability binary is similar enough to the gender/sex binary to glean
insights from feminist criticisms and developments of the gender/sex binary. Is
the disability binary much like the gender/sex binary and thus in a position to
glean from prior feminist insights? Or is disability sufficiently different that
disability theory should chart its own path?
Both sex and impairment have historically been seen as mere questions of
biology. In this context, gender and disablement were terms fashioned by advo-
cates with political objectives in mind and for similar purposes: to counter
biological determinism and secure the civil rights of women and people with
disabilities. Indeed, the binaries present a natural parallel. Sex is much like
impairment, with both terms said to represent biological traits. Similarly, gend-
er is like disablement, with both terms representing socially constructed traits."
Moving beyond these more obvious parallels, the biological component of
each binary has particular salience in a way that has little import for other
identity groups (including those based on race or national origin). Generally
a matter of occupying either a subordinate or a privileged social position); Natalie
Stoljar, Essence, Identity and the Concept of Woman, 23 PHILOSOPHICAL Topics
261, 283-84 (1995) (identifying four clusters that help organize the concept of
"woman").
54. Case, supra note 43, at 37-41.
55. See id. at 37 ("The [U.S. Supreme] Court, as it was faced with increasingly subtle
and complex barriers to the equality of the sexes, has gradually broadened its
conception of impermissible sex stereotyping, lumping together under the same
general heading several related but conceptually distinguishable phenomena.").
56. STONE, supra note 35, at 30.
57. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 3, at 29 ("The redefinition of disability in the social
model parallels the feminist movement's redefinition of women's experience in
the early 1970s."); Samaha, supra note ii, at 1280-82 (arguing that the terms of the
social model were fashioned by disability advocates with policy objectives in
mind).
58. None of the analysis comparing the gender/sex and disability binaries (and, at
some level, women and disability) is intended to obscure the intersectional fact
that these concepts are interrelated for women with disabilities. Scholarship at the
intersection of disability and women is emerging and making a valuable contribu-
tion to understanding disability. See, e.g., GENDERING DISABILITY (Bonnie G.




speaking, some biological characteristics act as impediments to equality and
must be accounted for when crafting policy.5 9 Such characteristics are uniquely
present in both women and people with disabilities. For example, feminists
have accounted for women's biological capacity to bear children via the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, 0 and disability advocates have accounted for dis-
abled physiology via the ADA's access and accommodation requirements.6'
Interestingly, different legal treatment may both further and hinder equali-
ty. Taking account of biological differences can help foster equality of opportu-
nity. However, given many Americans' strong ideological bent toward formal
equality, differential treatment is often perceived as special treatment. And such
treatment can birth or sustain stereotypes that militate against genuine equality.
This is a distinct challenge shared by both women and people with disabilities.
Despite their many similarities, there are a few differences between the
binaries worth noting. First, there may be a difference in the types of barriers
identified by advocates. In particular, some have argued that while nothing is
intrinsically problematic about being a woman-remove social discrimination
and most females will flourish-the barriers disabled people face are more
complex." Such barriers are said to involve both discrimination and some
measure of intrinsic limitations.6 3 As an example, some limitations would exist
for a visually impaired person even if all physical, institutional, and attitudinal
barriers could be eliminated. The limited ability to see would persist and limit
that individual's capacity to function in a world where most people have more
sight.
Yet this argument underestimates the intrinsic barriers women face. Wom-
en have some limitations built into their physical stature. Most of these have to
do with physical strength and size, but there are also myriad contingencies
associated with the capacity to reproduce. Thus, while there may be some
differences between the barriers faced by women and people with disabilities,
the difference is less pronounced than has been acknowledged.
A second difference is that while gender may be chosen, disablement is
rarely volitional. Feminists have championed the claim that sex does not deter-
mine gender; one may choose a gender that does not conform to traditional sex
59. In other words, the law must sometimes treat people differently to achieve equali-
ty. See, for example, Jessica L. Roberts, An Area of Refuge: Due Process Analysis and
Emergency Evacuation for People with Disabilities, 13 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 127
(2005), for an analysis of equal protection jurisprudence for people with disabili-
ties.
60. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (20o6).
61. Americans with Disabilities Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2006 & Supp. 2010)).
62. E.g., Shakespeare, supra note io, at 202.
63. Id.
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roles.4 The matter of escaping biology is not simple in the context of either
binary, but volition is a particularly complex phenomenon for disabled persons.
While one diagnosed with a debilitating disease may choose her/his attitude in
internalizing a condition, some impairments seem unavoidably disabling.
Third, the gender/sex binary has a certain neutrality that is absent for the
disability binary in that the gender/sex binary refers to ways of identifying a
person, whereas the disability binary refers to ways in which a person is limited
or impaired. Here, the word "impairment" has a particularly negative connota-
tion that its counterpart in the analogy ("sex") does not have. While the disabil-
ity binary does seem less culturally neutral than the gender/sex binary, both bi-
naries still represent efforts to describe or characterize groups of people.
Although differences between the two binaries and their constituents do
exist, the binaries are still sufficiently similar to merit comparison. The most
important elements of the analogy between the disability and gender/sex bina-
ries still hold: (i) Each binary is predicated on a nature/culture split wherein
one component of the binary represents that which is natural and biological
and the other represents that which is socially constructed; and (2) each binary
was fashioned to further the same objective-illuminating the socially con-
structed nature of what it means to be a woman, in the case of the gender/sex
binary, or disabled, in the case of the disability binary. In sum, the disability
binary is sufficiently like the gender/sex binary to warrant examination into
areas that feminists have tread.
III. DISABILITY TROUBLE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF IMPAIRMENT
As noted above, feminists took various approaches to troubling the gend-
er/sex binary." Analogizing from these contributions, there are at least three
questions one might ask in troubling the disability binary: (i) is impairment on-
ly biological?; (2) is disablement only social?; and (3) if the disability binary is
rejected as an inadequate construct for understanding disability, how might we
better reconstruct the meaning of disability? Because the meaning of impair-
ment has been undertheorized,66 and because the meaning of impairment also
64. E.g., BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 7, at 9 ("When the constructed status
of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a
free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as
easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body
as easily as a female one.").
65. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
66. While social modelists have focused on the meaning of disablement, impairment
has been sorely neglected. BARNES & MERCER, supra note 12, at 67; Carol Thomas
& Mairian Corker, A Journey Around the Social Model, in DISABILITY/
POSTMODERNITY, supra note 6, at 18, 24; see also Dan Goodley & Mark Rapley,
Changing the Subject: Postmodernity and People with 'Learning Difficulties', in Dis-
ABILITY/PosTMoDERNITY, supra note 6, at 127, 139 (noting that "impairment is up




affects the answers to the second and third questions, I limit my analysis in this
Article to the first question.
In the context of the gender/sex binary, feminists similarly questioned
whether sex was only biological;6 they were concerned that the sex component
of the binary indicated there was an underlying biological essence associated
with being a woman.68 To rebut this inference, feminists took various ap-
proaches. Butler discussed "girling," the stylized reiteration that one is a "girl"
by various authorities at various points in a person's life to reinforce the "natu-
ralized effect" of sex.69 Some scholars similarly argued strict sexual dimorphism
could be seen as a contemporary phenomenon. 70 Others explored how biologi-
cal processes unique to women may be so severely colored by medical interven-
tions, as well as social preconceptions, that it is impossible to disaggregate biol-
ogy from sociology or intelligibly claim that sex precedes gender.71 Additionally,
scholars noted that gendered habits and traits relating to diet, stress, and activi-
ty can alter hormone levels and at least some sex characteristics.' Feminists
social model was expressly formulated to address social disablement, which was
merely contrasted with physiological impairment. Indeed, Oliver expressed his
belief that a theory of impairment should be developed separately from a theory
of disablement. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 42. While
some disability scholars have recently focused on impairment as an important
aspect of a disabled person's phenomenology, my project is different and more
theoretical: I explore impairment as a product of diagnosis to show how impair-
ment-traditionally understood as the objectively biological component of disa-
bility-is still often socially constructed.
67. Mikkola, supra note 46.
68. Id.
69. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LiMITS OF "SEX" 7-8
(1993).
70. See PROKHOVNIK, supra note 52, at 131 (arguing that strict sexual dimorphism
"was consolidated only in the twentieth century with the entrenchment of a
biological notion of a natural sex difference based on the presence of X and Y
chromosomes, which was taken as providing explanatory force"). The point
advanced by scholars like Prokhovnik is not that, historically, there was no
distinction between males and females, but rather that the biological distinctions
that existed were more varied and less militantly enforced. Id. at 130-32; see also
Case, supra note 43, at 15 n.35 (explaining that chromosomal taxonomy has com-
plicated sexual dimorphism in recent years).
71. See, e.g., PROKHOVNIK, supra note 52, at 130 ("The physiological dimension of sex
is not isolable from the network of social conventions and practices which influ-
ence the meaning of sex."); id. at 135 (explaining how natural drives-such as
motherhood and sexuality-are mediated through social practices).
72. See e.g., STONE, supra note 35, at 35 (noting research that suggests sexual dimor-
phism is exaggerated in western industrial societies due to social forces and
mating practices); id. at 8o (noting that exercise may reduce the size of female
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resisted the idea that sex is non-social in part because social forces affect biology
and medical disciplines (which, in turn, claim to speak authoritatively about
biology).
Returning to the disability framework, is impairment solely biological? Put
another way, is impairment devoid of social input? Oliver and other social
modelists like him would seem to answer this question in the affirmative. As
Oliver stated, impairment is "nothing less than a description of the [disabled
person's] physical body."73 Contemporary disability scholars have consistently
recognized that this biology- centered definition of impairment is fundamental
to the social model.74 Such a definition of impairment raises the critical ques-
tion of who is disabled in the first place. What or who determines whether
someone is disabled?
A. Impairment as Diagnosis
In answering the question of how a person comes to be considered
disabled, the issue of diagnosis immediately emerges since the disabled person's
body is described as impaired principally through medical diagnoses. Diagnosis
is a core element for structuring and understanding disability. Indeed, without
diagnoses, many disabilities would not be understood as such by either the per-
son diagnosed or by others. Moreover, most disabled persons interface with
medical professionals who diagnose them throughout their lives, whereas sex
and diagnosis typically converge only at the time of birth (when the sex of a
child is pronounced by medical professionals). And medical diagnoses are often
difficult to escape, given that medical (and especially psychiatric) records seem
to have unusually long shelf lives.7 In short, impairments, understood as the
physical traits associated with disabilities, seem to be little more than diagnosis.
Thus, in answering the question of how a person comes to be considered dis-
abled, we may pose a second, closely related question: Is the diagnosis of im-
pairments based solely on biology?
breasts and hips or male gonads, and that diet may cause children to start puberty
early or cause women to stop menstruating altogether).
73. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY, supra note 3, at 35.
74. Areheart, supra note 2, at 188 (identifying the impairment/disablement distinction
as foundational to the social model); Crossley, Disability Kaleidoscope, supra note
21, at 657 (contrasting "bodily impairments" with "disability" under the social
model); Shakespeare, supra note io, at 197 (noting the dichotomy between biolog-
ical impairment and social disability as key to the social model).
75. In Madness, Distress, and Postmodernity, Anne Wilson and Peter Beresford docu-
ment their status as "psychiatric system survivors" and demonstrate how medical
and psychiatric records may restrict future life opportunities, understandings, and
rights. Anne Wilson & Peter Beresford, Madness, Distress and Postmodernity:




My argument in this Part is that diagnosis involves more than non-social
biology. Rather, diagnosis is a social concept in at least two tangible ways. First,
acceptable categories of diagnoses are created by a variety of non-medical
factors and take form as interested parties interact. The very existence of many
impairments is thus largely contingent upon political and social factors. Second,
the actual process of diagnosing an individual includes various social inputs
that assist the medical professional in concluding that a person has a particular
impairment. Examining the creation of diagnoses and the acts of diagnosis
through the lens of specific impairments illuminates the constructed and
contested nature of impairment.
In one sense, the claim that impairment is socially constructed may be seen
as a tautology, a particularized restatement of the idea that every aspect of a
person's identity is constructed and shaped by culture." This often leads to
poststructural scholarship on the body that reaches "fantastic levels of abstrac-
tion" without discussing the specific ways in which the body is politically and
historically situated.7 My argument is not so general: I am not simply interested
in proving that the impaired body is produced, but also in: (1) showing how the
impaired body is produced; and (2) identifying the interests served by its
production. To do so, I focus on the role of social factors, which influence both
the very creation of particular diagnoses as well as whether people are classified
as possessing those particular diagnoses.7"
While it is arguably possible to separate raw biology from its cultural
accoutrements, 7 biology is most salient when understood through its social
lens. The idea that socially constructed things are not real (and, therefore, that it
is necessary to preserve some sense of non-social biology) is merely a red
herring: The physical body, inseparable from the trappings of culture, is most
real and worthy of consideration as a whole. This Article thus creates disability
trouble by building a case against the presumption of a raw, "unadulterated
biological core."so As explored below, the acts of creating and applying diagnos-
es, ubiquitous in describing biological symptoms, are "always contingent upon
social factors."' Any "biological core" is thus always already adulterated."*
76. Charles E. Rosenberg, Introduction, in FRAMING DISEASE: STUDIES IN CULTURAL
HISTORY, at xiii, xiv (Charles E. Rosenberg & Janet Golden eds., 1997).
77. Mol, supra note 35, at 31, 52.
78. See ROBERT A. ARONOWITZ, MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS: SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND
DISEASE 176 (1998).
79. See IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999).
80. ARONOWITZ, supra note 78, at 171.
81. Id.
82. Cf BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 7, at 9-i0 (suggesting that sex "was
always already gender").
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B. The Creation of Diagnoses
It may be tempting to assume that diagnoses are divined from nature, that
they are a "self-evident reflection of biological and epidemiological facts.""3
Indeed, this seems to be the default, unreflective view. Yet, in a very real sense,
an impairment does not exist until we agree that it does-until it is created.84
For example, a child who ioo years ago might have been described as a "bad
student" might today be described as having dyscalculia (a learning disorder
associated with comprehending mathematics) or dysgraphia (a deficiency in the
ability to write). Similarly, a person who at one time might have been seen as a
"glutton" might now be understood as having bulimia nervosa. Such diagnoses
thus exist as a confluence of both biological and cultural factors. Despite the
modern tendency to see new diagnoses as the natural result of cumulative scien-
tific progress, this Section will show that the creation of diagnoses is often a
multi-factored process spurred along by political negotiation, financial incen-
tives, and/or social judgments and norms.
1. Mental Illness
Mental illness is a keen example of how diagnoses can be constructed when
key interests among medical scientists, doctors, patients, and businesses align.
For example, the creation of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome espite its non-
specific pathology-was beneficial for a variety of social groups. Medical scien-
tists received credit for discovering a new condition, clinicians found a
diagnostic solution to idiosyncratic suffering, patients received relief from
uncertainty and the promise of effective therapy, and businesses (especially
insurance and pharmaceutical companies) saw the prospect of additional reve-
nue." The "discovery" of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome can thus be seen as result-
ing from a confluence of key social factors and interests.86
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the
authoritative manual of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), provides a
window into how the creation of diagnoses is both politically and economically
driven. The DSM plays a critical gatekeeping role in determining which mental
illnesses are valid for insurance and clinical purposes. Each time a new edition
83. ARONOWITZ, supra note 78, at 58. Professor Aronowitz argues that such an
approach is flawed. He points to the creation of Lyme disease as an example of a
diagnosis built "implicitly and incrementally from a number of interacting fac-
tors," and not as a necessary result of analyzing objective biological facts. Id.
84. Rosenberg, supra note 76, at xiii.
85. See ARONOWITZ, supra note 78, at 36.




of the DSM is forthcoming, expert panels are established to meet and deliberate
about which diagnoses should be included and excluded.7
Currently, with a new iteration of the DSM forthcoming in 2012, heated
battles have already begun, involving various political and legal interests. For
example, many transgendered persons are already fighting the current diagnos-
tic categories of Gender Identity Disorder and Transvestite Fetishism." Binge
Eating,2' Internet Addiction, 0 and Parental Alienation Syndrome91 are also ten-
tative diagnostic categories likely to engender great controversy.
Such battles over whether a diagnostic category ought to exist in the first
place are legion. Past examples include the exclusion of homosexuality,92 the
inclusion of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,93 and the proposal and rejection of
the gender-biased Self-Defeating Personality Disorder.94 Each of these afore-
mentioned decisions had deep cultural implications and was ultimately effected
by pressure from political constituencies-demonstrating that far more was at
work than just raw biology and objective science.95
The creation of mental illnesses is also driven by financial incentives in the
form of pharmaceutical money. While the role of pharmaceutical companies in
87. See generally Lisa Cosgrove et al., Financial Ties Between DSM-JV Panel Members
and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 75 PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 154
(20o6) (noting the role expert panels play in determining which particular diag-
noses are included in the DSM).
88. Benedict Carey, Psychiatry's Struggle To Revise the Book of Human Troubles, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at Ai (noting that the DSM-related debate over gender iden-
tity "is already burning hot among transgender people"); Arline Kaplan, DSM-V
Controversies, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/
display/article/1o168/1364926.
89. Carey, supra note 88, at Al.
90. Kaplan, supra note 88.
91. Karen Franklin, Psychiatric Bible To Add New Diagnoses: DSM Makeover Process
Shrouded in Secrecy, AM. CHRON., Oct. 15, 2008, http://www.americanchronicle
.com/articles/view/77790.
92. See HERB KUTCHINS & STUART A. KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIA-
TRIC BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS 18, 55-99 (1997) (explain-
ing how protests by gay activists led to the elimination of homosexuality from the
DSM-II in 1974).
93. See id. at 18, 100-25 (explaining how Vietnam veterans fought for and achieved
inclusion of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the DSM despite the opposition of
many leading psychiatric experts).
94. See id. at 19, 126-75 (explaining how feminism fought against the inclusion of
Masochistic Personality Disorder in the DSM, which was later relabeled and
rejected as Self-Defeating Personality Disorder).
95. See id. at 24 ("[L]ike a large and popular mutual fund, DSM's holdings are
constantly changing as the managers' estimates and beliefs about the value of
those holdings change.").
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the development of diagnoses has historically been less publicized than many of
the political interests noted above, the connection between these companies and
the DSM is starting to receive more press. Pharmaceutical companies have a
general financial interest in expanding the number of diagnostic categories (and
concomitantly, the total number of persons who can be diagnosed),96 and the
individual companies also have particular financial interests in medical practi-
tioners prescribing their specific medications. 97 Pharmaceutical companies also
provide substantial funding to the APA.9' However, even more direct evidence
of financial connections between pharmaceutical companies and the DSM has
surfaced within the last five years.
In 2006, researchers at the University of Massachusetts and Tufts University
published a study entitled Financial Ties Between DSM-IV Panel Members and
the Pharmaceutical Industry.99 This study provided empirical support for what
many had suspected all along: Pharmaceutical money was connected to the cre-
ation of the DSM's diagnostic categories. In particular, the study found that the
majority of DSM panel members for the most recently published edition of the
DSM had substantial financial ties to one or more pharmaceutical companies.0 0
96. See id. at 13. One forensic psychologist cynically writes:
It's a tried-and-true formula: Do a quick-and-dirty study or two.
Find a huge, perhaps escalating, problem that has heretofore been over-
looked. Create a product label (aka diagnosis). And, voila! The drug
companies will take it from there. A diagnosis that was once just a twin-
kle in the eye of a creative researcher becomes reified as a concrete entity.
Franklin, supra note 91. Since the first edition of the DSM, the number of disord-
ers has tripled-an increase paralleled by an increase in sales of drugs. Ron
Grossman, Psychiatry Manual's Secrecy Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, at
A19.
97. See Benedict Carey & Gardiner Harris, Psychiatric Association Faces Senate Scrutiny
over Drug Industry Ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 20o8, at A13 (noting that, on average,
psychiatrists who received at least $5,000 from newer-generation antipsychotic
drugs wrote three times as many prescriptions to children for said drugs than psy-
chiatrists who received less money or none).
98. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 92, at 13; Cosgrove et al., supra note 87, at 155
("Pharmaceutical companies provide substantial funding for conventions,
journals, and research related to what is included in the DSM, because what is
considered diagnosable directly impacts the sale of their drugs."); see also Carey &
Harris, supra note 97 (noting that in 20o6, the latest year for which data was avail-
able, the drug industry accounted for thirty percent of the APA's $62.5 million in
financing).
99. Cosgrove et al., supra note 87.
1oo. Id. at 156. Revisions of the DSM are organized around working groups or panels.
Of the 170 DSM panel members, ninety-five of them, or fifty-six percent, had one
or more financial ties to a company in the pharmaceutical industry. Id. However,
even this statistic is understated since DSM panels for diagnostic categories in
which pharmacological interventions are standard treatment had much higher




Even the APA's President later acknowledged publicly that such ties exist and
could not be fully eliminated.o' Indeed, in 2008, the Center for Science in the
Public Interest found that more than half of the twenty-eight members of the
forthcoming DSM- V task force have ties to the drug industry.o2
2. Sensory Impairments
Sensory impairments provide an example of how even diagnoses with
seemingly unassailable biological foundations are constructed in significant
respects.
Who is blind? We certainly do not live in a world with only two types of
people: the blind and the sighted. Similarly, a diagnosis of blindness is not a
dividing line between those without sight and those with perfect sight. Indeed,
eighty percent of people who are legally blind have some amount of vision.1 03
Rather, the diagnosis of blindness represents a dividing line on a continuum
that ranges from perfect sight to total lack of sight. And drawing the line re-
quires judgment about who ought to count as blind (and just how much inabil-
ity to see the label "blind" entails). Accordingly, a diagnosis of blindness is not
just an issue of the body; it is also a social judgment by the medical community
example, one hundred percent of the panel members for the "Mood Disorders
Work Group" (8 out of 8) and the "Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders
Work Group" (7 out of 7) had financial ties to the pharmaceutical industry. Id. at
156-57. In contrast, the authors note that the panel for "Substance- Related Disord-
ers"-an area in which psychopharmacological treatment is much less likely-had
a much lower concentration (i out of 6). Id.
The authors conclude that while receiving financial support from a pharma-
ceutical company should not disqualify a person from serving on a DSM panel,
"the public and mental health professionals have a right to know about these fi-
nancial ties, because pharmaceutical companies have a vested interest in what
mental disorders are included in the DSM." Cosgrove et al., supra note 87, at 159.
101. Kaplan, supra note 88 ("'We have anticipated and addressed questions about con-
flicts of interest in the DSM process. The abolition of conflict is a myth....
[W]hat we can do is to be very clear about what those interests are."' (quoting
Nada Stotland, APA President)).
102. Psych Working Group Again Rife with Conflicts of Interests, INTEGRITY IN SCIENCE
WATCH: WEEK OF 05/05/o8, http://cspinet.org/integrity/watch/20o8o5o51.html#4
(last visited Apr. 3, 2011). Conflict- of-interest concerns were substantial enough to
prompt Congress to launch an investigation into the APA's funding and doctors'
financial arrangements with drug makers in 2008. See Carey & Harris, supra note
97.
103. SHELLEY KINASH, SEEING BEYOND BLINDNESS 5 (20o6).
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about who ought to be considered "blind."1 4 Deafness may be understood in
much the same way.
3. Eating Disorders
One way of examining whether diagnosis is a social creation is to ask
whether diagnoses are new or transient, i.e., whether they exist or have existed
only at certain times and in certain places (and are thus context- dependent).'
Although identified in the 1870s, anorexia nervosa was a rare disorder for
nearly a century."o' However, in the 1970s and 198os, the nature of anorexia's
symptomatology began to change and its incidence increased dramatically in
America.o0 Two new (but now common) symptoms emerged: compulsive
physical activity and bulimia (bingeing and purging).o' The reasons given for
the symptom of not eating also began to shift from somatic (for example, "I
cannot eat because it hurts") to psychosomatic (for example, "I don't need to
eat; I am too fat").0 9 What exactly happened?
Any attempt to explain changes in anorexia's incidence and symptomatolo-
gy from a purely biological perspective fails."0 It is only when one adds in
heightened cultural pressure to exercise and be thin, women's personal
freedom, desocialized eating environments, a lack of adolescent supervision,
and the ubiquity of food for purchase, that one begins to understand how the
cultural climate in America helped make anorexia a common condition with
new symptomatology."' Anorexia may thus be seen as a transient mental illness
that has flourished at specific times in specific places-namely contemporary
ones that extol a particular version of beauty."' In this respect, "eating disorders
appear ultimately to be cultural productions, no matter what biological
mechanisms they provoke."113
104. See generally Tanya Titchkosky, Cultural Maps: Which Way to Disability?, in DISA-
BILITY/POsTMODERNITY, supra note 6, at io, io-11 (exploring the ways in which
blindness is socially constructed).
105. In his book on social constructionism, Ian Hacking notes that some mental
illnesses are transient in that "they show up only at some times and some places,
for reasons which we can only suppose are connected with the culture of those
times and places." HACKING, supra note 79, at ioo.
io6 Joan Jacobs Brumberg, From Psychiatric Syndrome to "Communicable" Disease:
The Case of Anorexia Nervosa, in FRAMING DISEASE, supra note 76, at 134, 135.
107. Id. at 138-39.
io8. Id. at 138.
109. Id. at 137.
110. Id.
III. Id.
112. HACKING, supra note 79, at 2, 100-01.





Mental retardation is another example of a diagnosis constituted by social
norms. With ever-changing criteria and tests, one might reasonably see mental
retardation as "a historically contingent way of talking about people who appear
to be in need of assistance and who are not very good at IQ tests." 114 Mental
retardation is, in this way, a relative concept and a social judgment of sorts.1
None of this indicates that retardation is imaginary or not a real disability.
However, the diagnosis is also not a simple reflection of self-evident, physiolog-
ical facts; it requires an implicit cultural judgment about how much compe-
tence is normal, and when deviation from that normality is substantial enough
to be considered an impairment.
Or consider learning disabilities (LDs). Much like the diagnoses discussed
above under the DSM, the dozen or so conditions lumped together under the
umbrella term "LD"16 have been legitimated largely by economic and political
interests.1" The term "learning disabilities" was itself invented in 1963 by a psy-
chologist attempting to expand the circle of students who could be diagnosed as
"disabled" and thus entitled to federal protections and funding."' By the 198os,
LD diagnoses were soaring and the numbers continue to grow today."9 The
scope of what constitutes an LD has continued to widen since the term's incep-
tion, thereby subsuming an increasing number of Americans.'2 0
The salient question might be "why?" While some media outlets have
loosely attributed the growth of LD diagnoses to factors such as diet, exposure
to chemicals, and sedentary lifestyles,"1 most scholars examining the issue have
114. RAPLEY, supra note 12, at 42.
115. Id. at 41, 42, 202-03.
116. Craig S. Lerner, "Accommodations" for the Learning Disabled: A Level Playing Field
or Affirmative Action for Elites?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1043, 1064-65 (2004) (noting that
LD is a broad term encompassing dyslexia, dysgraphia, dyspraxia, dyscalculia,
dysrationalia, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADD/ADHD), "lan-
guage-based disability," and "auditory processing disability").
117. Kenneth A. Kavale & Steven R. Forness, The Politics of Learning Disabilities, 21
LEARNING DISABILITY Q. 245, 245 (1998); Lerner, supra note ii6, at 1058, 1076; see
also Kathleen Ross-Kidder, Interventions with Comorbid Emotional/Behavioral
Disordered Children, in CONTEMPORARY INTERDISCIPLINARY INTERVENTIONS FOR
CHILDREN WITH EMOTIONAL/BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 559, 560 (David A. Sabati-
no & Benjamin L. Brooks eds., 1998) (examining the quandary faced by parents of
seemingly intelligent children who had "unmet educational needs," and the per-
ceived need for those children to receive some type of educational intervention).
118. Lerner, supra note 116, at 1058.
119. Id. at 1071-73.
120. Id. at 1044-45.
121. Id. at 1074.
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concluded that the growth is due to distinct political and financial interests.'
Carl Elliott, a professor at the Center for Bioethics at the University of Minne-
sota, has argued that the ballooning of such diagnoses is not because people
have suddenly detected conditions that were hidden for hundreds of years.'
Rather, he notes it is because "all mental disabilities, even those with biological
roots, have a social component."2 4 Just like the DSM diagnoses discussed above,
many interests drive this trend, including those of LD educators (who obtain
federal aid for each student diagnosed as having an LD); psychologists (who
charge thousands of dollars to diagnose students); LD researchers (who are
incentivized by the lure of federal grants); attorneys (who can win judgments in
ADA cases); and pharmaceutical companies (who have pocketed billions of
dollars from medicines that target learning disabilities).'
5. Age-Related Impairments
A slightly different case for seeing impairment as socially constructed is
where the predicate physical conditions have always existed, but have not
always been considered problematic and diagnosed. For example, hip fractures,
spinal deformities, and loss of height were all once thought of as normal
by-products of aging."' They were not considered impairments or diagnosed in
any meaningful way.'2 7 However, since 1994, the World Health Organization has
classified osteoporosis (a major factor in each of the aforementioned
symptoms) as a disease that can be diagnosed, prevented, and treated.128 Such
institutional shifts have significant consequences because they affect medical
norms, which in turn affect the process of diagnosis.129 The development of
age-related impairments shows that normality and disease do not issue from an
unmediated form of biology; instead, biological data are interpreted through
existing knowledge of the body and in accordance with cultural standards.130
122. See supra note 117.
123. Carl Elliott, Costing an Arm and a Leg, SLATE, July 1o, 2003, http://slate.msn.com/
id/2o8 54 02.
124. Id.
125. Lerner, supra note 116, at 1077.
126. Jackie Leach Scully, A Postmodern Disorder: Moral Encounters with Molecular
Models of Disability, in DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY, supra note 6, at 48, 48.
127. Id.
128. Id.





C. The Acts of Diagnosis
A related way of challenging the assumption that impairment is only
biological is by examining the acts of diagnosis. To the extent that diagnosing
an individual requires interaction with the patient or interpretation of patient-
reported data, social norms become embedded into the ultimate diagnosis.
1. Mental Illness
Mental illness is one area of medicine that relies heavily on patient report-
ing. For example, in cases of depression, the medical practitioner's diagnosis
often relies on the patient's psychological self-assessment, which will almost
necessarily be informed by social meanings. A depressed person, to be classified
and diagnosed as such, must be able to communicate. 3' Instead of listing off
symptoms, the depressed subject must often produce a narrative of her depres-
sion.132 In producing such a narrative, the person's preconceptions relating to
depression and its symptoms will likely be incorporated. The very formation of
depression as an impairment thus depends upon patients' internalization of
their distress and later articulation to a medical professional.133 In this sense, the
diagnosis of depression involves an aggregation of social norms, a person's view
of her own symptoms, and a narrative dispensed to the medical professional.
Any effort to isolate the part of depression that is biological impairment (as op-
posed to social disablement) would seem artificial at best.
Other diagnoses can similarly be seen as controlled more by the patient
than the physician.13 4 For example, the criteria for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome
are patient-centered, permitting the patient to effectively define the disease
based on her particular symptomatology.'35 There has been a steady rise in diag-
noses that depend upon patient-reported symptoms-the result of a trend
toward "functional" diagnoses, or solutions to "the problem of idiosyncratic
suffering not readily explainable by specific pathology."'36
Another reason that impairment is less objective and more social than
previously theorized is that diagnoses for mental illness involve considerable
subjectivity and interpretation on the part of medical practitioners. Psychiatry is
131. Anna Mollow, "When Black Women Start Going on Prozac...": The Politics of
Race, Gender, and Emotional Distress in Meri Nana-Ama Danquah's Willow Weep
for Me, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, supra note 6, at 283, 290.
132. Id. at 290.
133. Id. at 290 f.30 (noting that "the formation of depression as an impairment catego-
ry has depended in large part upon patients' verbal articulations of their
distress").
134. ARONOWITZ, supra note 78, at 31.
135. Id. at 31.
136. Id. at 16.
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not like cardiology or nephrology, where the basic diseases are well understood
and identifiable by non-subjective criteria' 7: "No blood tests exist for the
disorders in the DSM."'3 " Rather, patients rely on judgments from practitioners,
who in turn rely on subjective phenomena and the manual.' 9 Yet once subjec-
tive phenomena (such as finding difficulty in practical life tasks or not doing
well on IQ tests) are re-described as symptoms, a cultural condition is trans-
formed into a medically identifiable pathology.140 There have even been
published studies in which psychiatrists, trained in using the DSM, cannot even
agree on which class of diagnoses (such as "personality disorder") a disability
falls into, much less reach agreement on a specific diagnosis within that class.141
Some disagreement as to application is, of course, natural; still, disagreement
illuminates the fact that diagnosis is a process that is not immune from social
influences.1 42
2. Intellectual Impairments
Another example of the constructed nature of diagnosis can be found in
considering the use of diagnostic assessments to determine diagnoses. Mark
Rapley, a professor of psychology at the University of East London, has
explored how intellectual disabilities are constructed through the psychological
assessments intended to diagnose them.143 He notes that this occurs in part
137. Carey, supra note 88, at Ai ("'This is not cardiology or nephrology, where the
basic diseases are well known."' (quoting Edward Shorter, History Professor,
University of Toronto)).
138. Dan Vergano, Study: Medical Manual's Authors Often Tied to Drugmakers, USA
TODAY, April 20, 2006, at A6 (quoting Lisa Cosgrove, Psychology Professor,
University of Massachusetts Boston).
139. Id.
140. RAPLEY, supra note 12, at 43-44.
141. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 92, at 52-53; see also Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness:
Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 5o HASTINGs L.J. 241, 248 (1999)
("[M]ental health professionals often express greater disagreements about an
appropriate diagnosis for a particular patient because the relevant symptoms tend
to be non-specific, which means that any number of mental illnesses could
account for the particular complaint.").
142. See KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 92, at 53 ("Serious confusion about distinguish-
ing mental disorders from nondisordered conditions and the inability of clini-
cians to use the manual reliably make the development and use of DSM vulnera-
ble to a host of nonscientific pressures."). Even medicine's technical aspects,
which are seemingly unrelated to cultural influences, are "shaped in part by the
shared intellectual worlds and institutional structures of particular communities
and subcommunities of scientists and physicians." Rosenberg, supra note 76, at
xiv.




because of an "acquiescence bias," in which respondents to surveys have a ten-
dency to indicate a positive answer to questions, or simply agree.144 This
dynamic is amplified in the realm of intellectual disabilities because medical
professionals often assume that their patients are incapable of reporting on their
own conditions.145 One result of this bias for assessments is that an interviewee
may be shepherded into apparently inconsistent answers by a range of interac-
tional phenomena: the interviewee's perceived need to reformulate responses to
questions;146 the interviewer's pursuit of "correct" answers (based on his or her
expectations);147 and the interviewer's desire to obtain an answer in the official
vocabulary of the interview schedule.14 While it is difficult to provide concise
examples of these phenomena, Rapley's conclusions are supported through
extensive use of case studies and examples.' 49 In such cases, inconsistencies are
produced by the logic of the interviewer's demands.' Rapley concludes that
such methods of diagnosis necessarily shift intellectual disability from the realm
of an individual, biological problem to an interactional, social product."'
D. Impairment Exists on a Continuum
The creation of diagnoses and acts of diagnosis reveal how impairment
exists as part of a continuum, rebutting the tempting inference that impairment
is itself a binary concept (with a world full of impaired and non-impaired
144. RAPLEY, supra note 12, at 8o-84.
145. See id. at 28-29 (noting that, given the tests employed, it is unsurprising that
medical professionals view people with intellectual disabilities as unreliable
reporters on their own lives).
146. Because the normal question-and-answer means of verbal exchange is suspended,
the imbalance may produce pseudo -acquiescence. Id. at 93.
147. Interviewers often do not accept a respondent's first answer and push the inter-
viewees into self-contradictory responses. Id. at 95. However, these contradictions
are a logical consequence of the (often convoluted) path of questioning. See id. at
94-96.
148. Id. at 96-101. Interviewers may suggest improvements to answers to "shepherd[]
the respondent's answer into more acceptably official shape." Id. at 205.
149. See id. at 78-110 (providing detailed analyses of conversations between medical
professionals and people with intellectual disabilities).
150. Id. at 89-90.
151. See id. at 202 ("[Intellectual] competence is very much a relative concept and
moreover one which is, in actual social practices, actively negotiated."); id. at 208
("I think that it is reasonable to suggest that what we have become used to
thinking [of] as an essentialised condition afflicting persons is... nothing but a
social construct and cultural artifact.... Intellectual disability is, then, not a
thing- in-the -world awaiting discovery, but rather is a disreputable moral status
socially constructed, by psy, as a speakable truth about [people considered intel-
lectually disabled]." (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
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people). For example, mental illness diagnoses implicate a wide array of socia-
lized behaviors, including the way in which one responds to stress, how much
anxiety or sadness one should feel, and when and how one should sleep, eat,
and express oneself sexually."' All of these behaviors exist on a continuum and
are not binary concepts. This means that in order to make particular diagnoses,
a line must be drawn somewhere to mark the point at which normal behavior
has crossed into pathology.
Blindness, deafness, disordered eating, and intellectual impairments all
represent a range of qualities and/or abilities regarding certain aspects of the
body. Who is blind, deaf, bulimic, or mentally retarded is thus a question of
degree based on graduated differences. At some point on each continuum, a
line must be drawn to effectuate the diagnosis. The same principle applies to the
process of diagnosis; there, lines must be drawn to determine whether particu-
lar people's behavior or sensory abilities fall within the realm of predetermined
disabilities. This line-drawing is complicated and made inconsistent by the inte-
ractional phenomena associated with physician and patient. Accordingly, where
we draw lines for diagnoses may change over time (creation of diagnoses), or
may change depending on the patient and/or physician (acts of diagnosis). The
result is that impairment is most aptly understood as a non-binary, spectrum
concept. This observation underscores my thesis that impairment, understood
as diagnosis, is socially constructed.
E. Perhaps Impairment Was Always Already Disablement
Having explained how biological impairment is often constructed, one
might question whether impairment (and ultimately disability) is entirely
constructed. After building the case that sex was constructed, Butler similarly
questioned whether sex "was always already gender, with the consequence that
the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all."153
Within the disability framework, given my argument that impairment is
thoroughly constructed, we might question whether impairment is always
already disablement, with the result that the division between impairment and
disablement turns out to be inconsequential. And if the distinction is no
distinction at all, what then is left of biology?
This latter question has often consumed the attention of Butler's critics,
who argue that she has lost sight of "the concrete, historical body that loves,
suffers, and dies." 5 4 Butler acknowledges that there is indeed something neces-
152. KUTCHINS & KIRK, supra note 92, at 15.
153. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 7, at 9-1o.
154. Moi, supra note 35, at 49. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, The Professor of
Parody: The Hip, Defeatist Feminism of Judith Butler, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22,




sary and inescapable about such "primary and irrefutable experiences.""' She
does not claim that there is no material body; just that we can only apprehend
that material body through discourse.'56 This means that while the body is not
reducible to language,'" it is only accessible through language."' In other words,
"there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further
formation of that body."' 9 Her ultimate concern is to interrogate constructions
of sex that have come to be seen as essential and natural.xs
Here, I simultaneously converge with and depart from Butler's project. Like
Butler, I am not denying that biology exists, but endeavoring to show how the
version of biology with which medical professionals interact is contested and
refracted by social interests. I am unconcerned with demarcating culture from
nature or social inputs from biology; in many ways, the question of what is left
of biology reintroduces that which was problematically an assumption of the
gender/sex and disability binaries from the start: the presence of a raw biologi-
cal core that may be neatly extricated from the concept of woman or disability. I
am interested in showing how impairment is constructed and the interests that
are served by its construction, not in drawing lines to show the boundaries of
biology.
Unlike Butler, I am less focused on discourse and more focused on
attempting to provide an account of the impaired body that provides political
and historical context. Social constructionism has, in recent years, become a
trendy and often obtuse way to discuss a subject."' Here, I have labored to
employ social constructionism usefully by providing concrete examples of how
impaired bodies are produced.
One final point that bears reiteration is that my argument, as applied to
particular disabilities, does not imply that those disabilities are not real or valid.
Social constructionism (here, my claim that biological impairment is socially
155. BUTLER, supra note 69, at xi, 66-67; see also MOYA LLOYD, JUDITH BUTLER: FROM
NORMS TO POLITICS 70-71 (2007).
156. See Judith Butler, Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir's Second Sex, in 72 YALE
FRENCH STUDIES: SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR: WITNESS TO A CENTURY 35, 45 (Hlkne
V. Wenzel ed., 1986) ("As a locus of cultural interpretations, the body is a material
reality which has already been located and defined within a social context. The
body is also the situation of having to take up and interpret that set of received
interpretations."); see also SARA SALIH, JUDITH BUTLER 74-75 (2002) (arguing that
Butler acknowledges the material body, but noting that she also emphasizes
discourse as the only way to apprehend that body).
157. BUTLER, supra note 69, at 6.
158. Id. at io.
159. Id.
160. Id. at xi.
161. See, e.g., HACKING, supra note 79, at vii-viii, 1-3 (explaining that the language of
social constructionism is trendy, overused, and often not very meaningful).
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constructed) is often caricatured as asserting that a particular thing is a "mere"
construct and thus arbitrary or illegitimate.'62 I am not denying that biology
exists; instead, I am challenging the idea that biological accounts of the body
(that is to say, diagnoses) are asocial, or merely descriptive. My general point is
that we need to think more carefully about disabled identity, not that socially
constructed diagnoses are illegitimate.
F. Avenues for Further Research
A number of potentially fruitful avenues for examining the relationship
between the gender/sex and disability binaries remain, and I note three of them
here. In this vein, creating disability trouble opens new possibilities for contin-
ued research rather than closing the book on disabled identity.
First, scholars might document how impairments other than those
discussed here are constructed through social inputs. In particular, more work
might be done to show how impairment is the construct of a particular regime
that polices the diagnosis and identification of disabled bodies.'63 Second, it
might be fruitful to further deconstruct the disability binary by examining
disablement. This might involve asking how disablement relates to the biologi-
cal body, just as deconstructionist feminists questioned how gender relates to
the biological body.164 Third, scholars might explore how to reconstruct the
concept of disability. If disability is deconstructed and shown to be more fluid
and less dichotomous than previously thought, what is left of the term? In the
gender/sex context, feminists have taken a variety of approaches in answering
this question, including Natalie Stoljar's resemblance nominalism,"' Linda
Alcoffs positionality,'66 and Sally Haslanger's social subordination.6 7 Any or all
162. ARONOWITz, supra note 78, at 14.
163. See Shelley Tremain, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory, in
FOUCAULT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DISABILITY 5-6 (Shelley Tremain ed., 2005)
(arguing that a vast programmatic apparatus-including asylums, special educa-
tion programs, telethons, prenatal diagnoses, and quality of life assessments-has
"created, classified, codified, managed, and controlled social anomalies through
which some people have been divided from others and objectivized as (for
instance) physically impaired, insane, handicapped, mentally ill, retarded, and
deaf").
164. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
165. See Natalie Stoljar, The Politics of Identity and the Metaphysics of Diversity: Concep-
tions of Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy, 8 PROC. OF THE 20TH WORLD
CONGRESS PHIL. 21, 27-28 (2000) (arguing that "woman" is a "cluster concept"
organized on the basis of "different arrangements of features in different individ-
uals"); Stoljar, supra note 53, at 283-84 (identifying four clusters that help organize
the concept of "woman").
166. See ALCOFF, supra note 53, at 148 (arguing that gender is "a position one occupies




of these approaches might be applied in the disability context to reconstruct
what exactly is meant, and who exactly is encompassed, by the term "disabled."
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Making disability trouble has myriad policy and legal implications, a few of
which I will introduce here. As noted above, work on the gender/sex binary
spurred several forms of legal innovation and forever altered legal scholarship
on the meaning of gender and sex. Such scholarship came at a critical time and
revolutionized what it meant to be a woman. Similarly, the concept of disability
is in a unique stage of theoretical development, and the evolution of its mean-
ing may alter both society's and the judiciary's perceptions."' The medical
model of disability has been entrenched as the standard paradigm for under-
standing disability in both the media and the federal judiciary.6 9 As the mean-
ing of disability turns further to social explanations, legal change may well
follow.' 0
A. Disability Stereotyping
The arguments in disability trouble underscore the need for robust protec-
tions against disability stereotyping, and reinforce the recent amendments to
the ADA's "regarded as" prong, which protects individuals who are regarded as
having a disability and experience employment discrimination on that basis.''
As noted above, one legal response to feminist work on the gender/sex
binary was the emergence of sex- stereotyping jurisprudence.172 In particular, a
richer understanding of the meaning of gender and sex paved the way for judges
to protect various permutations of gender and sex stereotyping under Title VII.
men are differentiated by virtue of their different relationship of possibility to
biological reproduction").
167. See Haslanger, supra note 53, at 6-7 (arguing that "gender is a matter of occupying
either a subordinate or a privileged social position").
168. Indeed, it seems that one way in which consensus was built for protecting subor-
dinated racial and sexual groups was by first advancing a scholarly dialogue about
what it means to be, for example, Latina, queer, or a woman who defies gender
norms.
169. See generally Areheart, supra note 2 (arguing that the medical model of disability
has been entrenched as the standard paradigm for understanding disability in
both the media and the federal judiciary).
170. See id. at 208-09 (explaining that the judiciary's paradigm of disability is influ-
enced by cultural understandings).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (C), (3) (Supp. 2010) (defining "disability" in terms of be-
ing "regarded as" having an impairment); id. § 12112(a) (prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of disability).
172. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, my arguments about disability support recent legal innovations in the
area of disability stereotyping.
The ADA has historically protected from employment discrimination
individuals who: (1) have "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities;" (2) have "a record of such an impair-
ment;" or (3) are "regarded as having such an impairment." 173 The third prong
covers disability stereotyping and is seemingly expansive, but has been narrowly
interpreted by courts. In particular, courts have required not only that a person
be regarded as having a mental or physical impairment (a low bar), but also that
she be regarded as having an impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities (a high bar).174 Accordingly, a suit brought under the
"regarded as" prong has faced all the difficulties of proving actual disability in
addition to the difficulties associated with proving that any such conception
existed in the "theoretical mind" of the employer.17 The result has been rela-
tively weak disability stereotyping jurisprudence.
Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 20o8 (ADAAA)176 to streng-
then disability protections."' The most significant change was to expand
coverage for disability stereotyping. The ADA now expressly provides that in
order to meet the requirement of being "regarded as" having an impairment,
one does not need to show that an impairment limits, or is perceived to limit, a
major life activity.' 8 In other words, the ADA's "regarded as" prong now covers
anyone treated adversely because of an impairment, actual or perceived, with-
out requiring a showing of limited bodily functionality.179 This change is signifi-
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C) (2006).
174. Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee
Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1529-30 (2002).
175. Areheart, supra note 2, at 212 (quoting Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato,
Redefining "Disability" Discrimination: A Proposal To Restore Civil Rights Protec-
tionsfor All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 328 (2003)).
176. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12102).
177. For further discussion of the ADAAA, see Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism:
What the ADA Amendments Act of 2oo8 Can and Can't Do for Disability
Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://works.bepress.com/kevin-barry/2; Jeanette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts:
The ADA Amendments Act of2oo8, 85 IND. L.J. 187 (2010); Sharona Hoffman, The
Importance of Immutability, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483 (2011); Amelia Michele
Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 331 (2010);
Alex. B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 217 (2008).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) (A) (Supp. 2010).
179. Id. ("An individual meets the requirement of 'being regarded as having such an
impairment' if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an




cant in part because while courts have historically interpreted the "impairment"
requirement fairly broadly, they have interpreted the "substantially limits" and
"major life activities" requirements more narrowly.'s Eliminating the latter two
requirements for "regarded as" claims will thus ease the burden of proving dis-
ability status and likely make the "regarded as" prong the primary vehicle for
discrimination claims.'"' The reinvigorated "regarded as" prong also makes clear
that people's attitudes disable.'* By broadening coverage for disability stereo-
typing, Congress has taken a bold step in the direction of universal nondiscri-
mination protection.'
By troubling the disability binary, this Article provides both sociological
and theoretical support for that bold step. The arguments here show that
impairment, rightly understood, is complicated-and is far more than just
biology. Impairment requires agreement from key social actors, evolves over
time, and is fraught with patient- and doctor-imposed subjectivity. Given the
fluid and ever-changing nature of impairment (as well as the constant additions
of diagnoses), everyone has the potential to be impaired in one way or another,
and thus everyone has the potential to be subjected to negative treatment based
upon attitudes about those impairments. This Article also supports the idea that
attitudinal and institutional barriers, not impairments taken alone, disable
people. This account of impairment suggests that courts should be generous in
interpreting the scope of impairment and should keep disability stereotyping
protections strong by setting a low bar for what is required to show that one is
"regarded as" having an impairment.
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit
a major life activity.").
i8o. Areheart, supra note 2, at 211.
181. Barry, supra note 177 (manuscript at 264-66). Although one may seek reasonable
accommodations under the "regarded as" prong, the ADAAA does not require
covered entities to provide them on that basis alone. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h). Accor-
dingly, the "actual disability" and "record of disability" prongs, which continue
to require some sort of limitation of bodily function or life activity, id.
§ 12102(1)(A)-(B), will likely be the primary vehicle for accommodation claims.
Barry, supra note 177 (manuscript at 264-66).
182. Barry, supra note 177 (manuscript at 278); see also id. (manuscript at 282) ("By
protecting nearly everyone from discrimination based on impairments, the
ADAAA's 'regarded as' prong relieves people of the need to show that they are
different because of the way their impairments limit them. Now all they need
show is that others limited them because of their impairments.").
183. See generally id. (arguing that the ADAAA represents a move "toward universal-
ism").
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B. Per Se Disabilities
The arguments presented in this Article also support amending the ADA to
include per se disabilities that are generally stigmatized. Doing so would protect
certain established, stigmatized conditions regardless of whether they substan-
tially limit one or more major life activities. Per se disabilities would be auto-
matically covered without any showing of limitation. Impairments not on the
per se list would still need to meet the general requirement for showing actual
disability: that one must have "a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities.18"4 A per se list of disabilities was
considered in the negotiations over the recent amendments to the ADA, but
was ultimately omitted from the proposed legislative language."'
The arguments in Part III of this Article support the addition of a per se list
to the ADA because there is a short distance between understanding impair-
ments as being constructed by culture and understanding impairments as being
constructed by a culture that stigmatizes those impairments. For example, the
diagnosis of mental retardation is also a social stigma in that the decision to
pathologize a particular level of mental competence simultaneously imbues that
level with a stigma. Similarly, blindness and deafness carry a certain stigma that
results from the implicit social judgment about what amount of hearing or sight
is less than normal. Understanding how particular impairments are socially
constructed sheds light on how they are also culturally stigmatized. And the
existence of broad-based stigma for certain conditions, in turn, counsels in
favor of ADA coverage.
It might initially appear that this recommendation is in tension with the
arguments in Part III regarding the fluid, subjective nature of impairment since
a per se list could imply that certain diagnoses are static or relatively objective.
However, using the level of stigma associated with impairments-and not med-
ical criteria-to determine which impairments should be on the per se list
would obviate any concern about "objective" biology serving as the basis for
such a list. And while it is true that some stigmatizing impairments may lose
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
185. The per se list in the proposed legislative language read as follows:
Absent, artificial or replacement limbs, hands, feet or vital organs;
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis; bipolar disorder; blindness or significant
vision loss (as defined in (8)); cancer; cerebral palsy; chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease; Crohn's disease; cystic fibrosis; deafness or substan-
tial abnormal hearing loss; diabetes; substantial disfigurement; epilepsy
(seizure disorders); coronary heart disease or heart attacks; human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV infection) or AIDS; kidney or renal diseases
(excluding kidney stones); lupus; major depressive disorder; mental re-
tardation (intellectual disabilities); multiple sclerosis; muscular dystro-
phy; spinal cord injury; Parkinson's disease; pervasive developmental
disorders; rheumatoid arthritis; schizophrenia; and acquired brain injury.




their stigma over time, this possibility could be addressed by a provision dele-
gating to the EEOC authority to monitor the relative levels of stigma attached to
the listed impairments and to make recommendations to Congress on a period-
ic basis.186
Admittedly, there are reasons for not having a per se list of impairments.
First, a per se list could be seen as dividing the disability community into those
who are "in" and those who are "out."'8 ' In this way, a per se list might decrease
solidarity within the disability community as a whole.' 8 Indeed, in the negotia-
tions over the recent amendments to the ADA, disability activists opposed the
inclusion of such a list on just this ground.8 9 Second, a per se list might incite
courts to "ratchet up" the level of severity that is required for impairments not
on the per se list. 9 o
Despite these drawbacks, the benefit of such a list is obvious. It would
ensure that the ADA covers certain disabilities that are generally stigmatized
and severe. For example, why force every plaintiff with epilepsy to prove that he
or she is deserving of the ADA's protections? A per se list would create consis-
tency in protecting impairments that have previously been protected on a
notoriously inconsistent basis, such as diabetes.'91 Such a change would also be
consonant with the vision of the ADA's framers in at least one critical respect:
The drafters of the ADA never intended that one person with a particular con-
dition be covered by the ADA while another with the very same condition goes
uncovered. 92
186. For example, the recently enacted Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
provides that "6 years after the date of enactment of this Act, there shall be estab-
lished a commission, to be known as the Genetic Nondiscrimination Study
Commission[,] ... to review the developing science of genetics and to make rec-
ommendations to Congress regarding whether to provide a disparate impact
cause of action under this Act." Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 208(b), 122 Stat. 881, 917 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ff-7 ). A similar provision, directing the EEOC to monitor the impairments
on the per se list and make recommendations regarding additions or subtractions
to Congress a few years later, could be included in my proposed amendment.
187. Barry, supra note 177 (manuscript at 270).
i88. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. (manuscript at 269-70) (noting that courts could conclude that "if absent
limbs and cancer were considered 'disabilities' under the per se list, non-listed
impairments must rise to that level of severity in order to 'materially restrict"').
191. See Areheart, supra note 2, at 213 n.242 (comparing federal court decisions reach-
ing differing conclusions on whether a diabetic plaintiff should be entitled to
protection under the ADA).
192. Chai Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under the Federal Anti-Discrimination
Law, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 151-52 (1999).
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One might question whether implementing this recommendation would
cause too many plaintiffs to survive summary judgment. Yet substantial hurdles
would still remain. A plaintiff would still need to show both that she was quali-
fied for the position she sought and that discrimination on the basis of a
protected disability was the reason for an adverse employment decision.'93
Moreover, in a case under the ADA seeking accommodation, the plaintiff
would still need to show that her request was reasonable and would not cause
the employer undue hardship.194
More importantly, it is imperative to recall the broad remedial intent of the
original ADA. 95 This broad remedial scope is underscored by the recent
amendments, which add the following rule of construction: "The definition of
disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of indi-
viduals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of
this chapter."196 Also, the ADAAA clarified that "the primary object of attention
in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the
ADA have complied with their obligations" and not "whether an individual's
impairment is a disability under the ADA."19 Adding a per se list would thus be
consistent with the express thrust of the recently amended ADA.
C. Greater Acceptance of Legal Solutions
The arguments giving rise to disability trouble ought to also increase public
support for legal protections for people with disabilities.
While equality and antisubordination norms should themselves be suffi-
cient to justify policies that help disabled persons, it may-as a practical mat-
ter-be useful to provide other justifications.'9 Indeed, many people seem to
view policies directed toward helping people with disabilities achieve equality of
opportunity as unwarranted, preferential treatment.199 This hostility may even
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
194. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
195. Areheart, supra note 2, at 230-31 (discussing broad remedial intent of the ADA).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (Supp. 2010).
197. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008).
198. See Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with
Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 312
(2009) ("While ideally the goals of equality and self-sufficiency for individuals
with disabilities should be enough to justify the ADA, and the majority's self-
interest should not determine disability policy, practical politics may require
identifying and highlighting benefits to nondisabled workers to help maintain
support for the law.").
199. Id.; see also Areheart, supra note 2, at 190 ("[M]any people seem to view discrimi-
nation against disabled people as rational-the result of their own bodies' defi-
ciencies-and distinguishable from other forms of discrimination. The result is




increase if the ADAAA has its intended effect of increasing the scope of the
ADA.200
The big-picture insight of this Article is that disability has an even more
substantial social origin than previously acknowledged. And a social origin at
least arguably implies social responsibility.2 0 ' As theorizing continues to illumi-
nate the fact that disability disadvantage flows from social structures and prac-
tices, the view that society has some responsibility to remedy that disadvantage
will naturally follow.2 0 2 Indeed, the idea that social cause justifies social respon-
sibility may be traced back to the civil rights movements of the 196os. One could
posit that as minorities integrated into mainstream society and people recog-
nized that racial divisions had their primary bases in social practices rather than
biological differences, support for social and political solutions increased. This
increase in support seemed to issue from a collective sense of what was just.
Similarly, troubling the disability binary may lead to greater acceptance of
legal solutions by disrupting the perceived divisions between disabled and non-
disabled people. Much of the "us-them" mindset stems from people viewing
disability as simply and utterly biological; in particular, a biologically reduction-
ist view allows a non-disabled person to easily differentiate herself from those
considered disabled. Yet as disability is shown to be more constructed and less
fixed, society should begin to understand the increasing contingency of being
labeled "disabled." Such contingency should make people more aware of the
need to protect broadly against disability discrimination.
One might question, however, whether this argument could have the effect
of decreasing support for legal protections. In particular, if disability is less
biological and more socially constructed, is it not just as likely that people will
become more skeptical toward legal protections for people with disabilities?
Similarly, one might question whether social accounts of causation make people
less sympathetic toward people with disabilities (and thus less likely to support
legal interventions).
While biologically reductionist accounts may, as a practical matter, encour-
age greater sympathy and persuade more people to favor disability protec-
tions,'0 3 popular support is only one goal of the disability rights movement. In
order to accomplish long-term workplace and social integration, it is also
ize disability discrimination."); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and
Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POLY REV. 477, 491 (2007) (noting that
adverse reaction to the ADA is centrally about the fact that it "targets rational
employer conduct").
200. Travis, supra note 198, at 320.
201. But see Samaha, supra note 11 (arguing that the causation account of the social
model prescribes no normative response).
202. Areheart, supra note 2, at 189 (citing Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation, supra
note 21, at 877).
203. See id. at 198-204 (demonstrating how focusing on disabled people's medical limi-
tations may lead to popular, and charitable, support).
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imperative that society realize that no huge gulf exists between people designat-
ed as disabled and those not so designated. While sympathy may yield formal
support for disability rights in the short term, it is difficult for people to pity
disabled persons and also to view them as having the same entitlement to rights
as people without disabilities (which is one long-term goal of disability advo-
cates).2 0 4 The arguments in Part III that impairments are socially constructed
are a step in the direction of illuminating disabled persons as not essentially
different. Additionally, the argument that society ought to account for the ills it
helps create is a normative argument about what is just. While this may or may
not correspond to what seems fair to the majority of the population, as
explained above, there is historical precedent for the idea that social cause justi-
fies social responsibility, even if people's prejudices persist.
D. Healthcare Policy
This Article also signals the need to pay close attention to the costs and
health effects associated with creating new diseases and impairments.
Access to healthcare is generally structured around "the legitimacy built
into agreed-upon diagnoses."0 ' Given this Article's explanation in Section IIJ.B
of the multiple interests that affect the process by which an impairment is
created, and given that one of those interests is the economic incentives of
certain industries, the medical community must be vigilant in assessing the
costs and benefits associated with creating and insuring new impairments.06 In
particular, insuring and treating new diseases or other conditions is not a cost-
less enterprise. There are real costs to medical professionals, who typically pass
those costs on to insurance companies, which in turn pass their costs on to con-
sumers in the form of insurance premiums. This cost-passing enterprise matters
because the creation of some diagnoses may be financially lucrative for compa-
nies, but may not confer meaningful health gains on patients.
Accordingly, it is vital to understand how social inputs help constitute
certain diagnoses. Indeed, the issue of cost is more salient than ever given the
large financial burden, which all Americans will shoulder, associated with the
historic health care legislation that was signed into law in 2010.207 Additionally,
204. Id. at 201; see also Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 625-26 (2004)
(observing that recognizing disabled persons as equal to people without disabili-
ties "requires a general transformation in social attitudes, most especially
acknowledgement of disability rights as rights rather than as a product of good-
will").
205. Rosenberg, supra note 76, at xiv.
2o6. See ARONOWITZ, supra note 78, at 37.
207. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to




given advances within the realm of genetic information,20s it is possible that new
diagnoses will emerge. In an era of expanding health care coverage, all costs
must be more closely examined.
E. Less Reliance on Medical Diagnoses
The arguments presented in this Article call for less reliance by courts on
medical diagnoses at the summary judgment stage of cases brought under the
ADA.20 9 Specifically, in making disability trouble, I reject the notion that medi-
cal labels and diagnoses are objective. The discussion in Section III.B explains
how many conditions that stand to qualify as disabilities under the ADA do not
involve definitive tests, but rather depend on non-objective social phenome-
na.'10 Also, many diagnostic labels are themselves social creations devised in
response to economic and political circumstances." Moreover, medical
professionals may, through their acts of diagnosing patients, create the very
symptoms constitutive of the conditions for which they are testing.'1 2 In sum,
one key insight of this Article is that diagnoses are less objective and less reliable
than often presumed.'1 3 Also, given the previously discussed fact that many
diagnoses rely heavily on patient input, the arguments in this Article suggest
that disabled persons are capable of testifying about their conditions and the
effect they have on major life activities.
Before examining courts' reliance on medical diagnoses, it may be useful to
examine the prima facie requirements under the "actual disability" prong of the
ADA, where the issue of medical evidence typically arises. Actual disability
contains three separate requirements: (1) There must be a physical or mental
impairment; (2) the impairment must be substantially limiting; and (3) the
208. For example, scientists have recently discovered that a gene associated with height
is linked to a genetic variant that predisposes its carriers to certain types of dis-
ease. Steve Connor, Newly Discovered Height Gene Has Disease Link, INDEPEN-
DENT, Sept. 3, 2007, at 13 (quoting Mike Weedon of the Peninsula Medical
School).
209. Cf Noah, supra note 141, at 303-o6 (calling for courts and agencies to reduce re-
liance on medical diagnoses); Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You're Disabled? The
Role of Medical Evidence in the ADA Definition of Disability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1
(2007) (calling for courts to reduce their reliance on medical evidence at the
summary judgment stage when a plaintiff seeks to establish a claim of disability
under the ADA.).
210. See supra Subsection JJI.B.1.
211. See supra Section III.B.
212. See supra Section III.C.
213. This argument fits under the broader Foucauldian claim that medical institutions
operate under a veneer of objectivity, but are in fact social institutions that rest on
social knowledge and social judgments. See generally FOUCAULT AND THE Gov-
ERNMENT OF DISABILITY, supra note 163.
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impairment must substantially limit a major life activity.2 14 It is the second
requirement-that the impairment substantially limit a major life activity-that
has garnered the majority of federal courts' attention.
Though making a prima facie case of actual disability does not require any
evidence beyond what would be known first-hand by the plaintiff,216 courts
often require medical evidence from plaintiffs at the summary judgment
stage.17 Indeed, courts rely heavily on medical diagnoses for determining
whether plaintiffs satisfy the definition for actual disability,"' and they have
been willing to grant summary judgment for defendants solely because plaintiffs
did not present medical evidence in support of their disabilities.219 Moreover,
courts often require medical evidence not only to help determine whether an
impairment is present, but also to help determine whether the impairment is
substantially limiting.2 0 Courts' reliance on medical diagnoses may even
increase since the ADAAA has made it easier for an individual seeking protec-
tion under the ADA to establish that she has a disability within the meaning of
the ADA. Courts may feel that retaining the medical evidence hurdle helps to
counterbalance the ADAAA's statutorily imposed loosening of the ADA's
threshold requirements.
Yet the de facto requirement of medical evidence for establishing a prima
facie case under the ADA is unprincipled. As an initial matter, neither the ADA
214. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (Supp. 2010).
215. Areheart, supra note 2, at 211-12.
216. See Smith, supra note 209, at 35 (noting that the judge's function at the summary
judgment stage does not involve "'weigh [ing] the evidence and determin[ing] the
truth of the matter"' (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986)).
217. Id. at 19-24.
218. Id. at 20 ("[T]he dominant trend... is to assign a central and indispensable role
to medical professionals in establishing disability for purposes of the ADA.").
Smith notes that some courts have taken an intermediate approach-which they
believe to be the "majority rule"-in which the necessity of medical evidence
depends upon the type of disability claimed and whether it is found by the court
to be within the comprehension of an average lay juror. Id. at 24 & n.96. However,
the Second Circuit approach of requiring medical evidence in order to establish a
prima facie case under the ADA is the approach taken by a majority of courts. Id.
at 24 n.96.
219. Id. at 40-42.
220. See, e.g., Machin-Rodriguez v. C&C P'ship Coca Cola P.R., No. 03-1746, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 42937, at *13 (D.P.R. Sept. 20, 2005) ("Plaintiffs medical evidence is
completely devoid of any reference as to the effect that Plaintiffs depression has
had, if any, on his major life activities."); Baerga v. Hosp. for Special Surgery, 15
Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 111, 116 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003) ("Plaintiffs failure
to provide medical documentation of his alleged sleeping difficulties renders his




nor the EEOC's regulations require such evidence."' Additionally, because no
list of presumptive or per se disabilities currently exists, a plaintiffs ability to
qualify as having an actual disability under the ADA depends on the functional
effect that an impairment has on his or her life. This inquiry into the substan-
tiality of the impairment involves facts about which the plaintiff is uniquely
suited to testify. For example, a plaintiff is particularly well-equipped to testify
regarding whether his back pain or medication prevents him from performing
certain major life activities. 223 A physician would only be able to authoritatively
testify as to back pain's general effect on people, and such testimony would
stand in stark contrast to the individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA.22 4
Finally, and most notably, my argument that courts should not require
medical evidence to show substantiality under the ADA's "actual disability"
prong is about establishing a prima facie case-what is required to make it to a
fact-finder-and not about what is ultimately persuasive to a fact-finder. It may
well be appropriate (and persuasive) for a jury to consider medical evidence and
testimony as part of a plaintiffs case.2 My argument is that a plaintiff ought to
create a fact issue on the substantiality requirement by his or her testimony
alone. Requiring medical evidence at the summary judgment stage essentially
delegates what should be a jury's credibility determination to physicians. 226
Such a requirement places an additional hurdle in front of ADA plaintiffs that is
not required by the statute or the EEOC's regulations.22
CONCLUSION
Disability scholarship is now in a critical stage. Theoretically, work on disa-
bility is young and entering a second wave of critical development." 8 Jurispru-
dentially, disability is at a pivotal stage as courts prepare to reinterpret the
provisions of the ADA in light of recent amendments. It is both timely and
221. Smith, supra note 209, at 7.
222. See supra Section JV.B.
223. Smith, supra note 209, at 67.
224. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 657 (1998) (explaining that the ADA
mandates "an individualized inquiry" for determining whether one has a covered
disability).
225. See Smith, supra note 209, at 62 ("A plaintiff who proceeds to trial without some
medical evidence to support her claims of harm does so at her own peril, but, of
course, courts allow imperiled claims to go to trial all the time.").
226. Id. at 41.
227. Id. at 7.
228. See Lennard J. Davis, Preface to the Second Edition, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES
READER, supra note 6, at xiii, xiii (explaining that disability scholarship is entering
a second wave of development in which "the foundational 'truths' come under
new scrutiny").
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appropriate to rethink the meaning of disability, and this requires attention to
the core explanatory construct in disability theory: the disability binary.
This Article advances the conversation about disability identity in a way
that is attentive to related areas of scholarship, especially feminist work on the
gender/sex binary. In this way, disability scholarship may draw on the richness
of others' contributions and avoid wheel-reinventing. There are legal implica-
tions to rethinking disability identity, and this Article identifies several of them.
Hopefully, scholars and activists will build upon these insights to further bridge
disability theory and practice.
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